Ghana introduced a social health insurance scheme in 2003. One of its motivations was to protect consumers against adverse health shocks. Financing for the programme comes from a 2.5% goods and service tax, contributions by formal sector workers directly transferred from their social security savings and individual premiums from informal members. This arrangement makes formal workers compulsory members of the scheme while informal members voluntarily enroll. We view this as a natural experiment in which one section of the population automatically acquires insurance (with formal sector employment), and the remainder choose to obtain the same coverage (or not). Using data from the 2009/2010 Ghana Socioeconomic Panel Survey, we explore the determinants of the uptake of health insurance by informal members and test whether this voluntary health insurance uptake impacts the frequency of use of health care resources. We find robust evidence that older, wealthier and more educated individuals are more likely to buy (voluntary) health insurance. Moreover, using the method of propensity score matching, we find that voluntary health insurance uptake is strongly associated with higher health care utilization-implying that, with respect to the frequency of use, the mode of insurance acquisition matters.
Introduction
Many low-and middle-income countries primarily employ user fee schemes for financing health care. Many studies, however, have warned of the negative impact of user fee schemes on health care utilization, especially among the poorest (Preker et al., 2004; World Bank, 2004; van Doorslaer et al., 2006; WHO, 2010) . In the event of ill health, the required payment of user fees may deter lowincome households from seeking necessary care. Moreover, even when they do seek care, many of these households may suffer financial hardships or impoverishment due to payments of significant medical expenses (Peters et al., 2002; Xu et al., 2003; McIntyre et al., 2011; Acharya et al., 2013) . More generally, user fees can impact the ability of households to smooth consumption over time (Townsend, 1994) . A fundamental question then facing low and middle-income countries is how to establish a health financing system that improves access to health care for all their citizens and increase financial protection. Against this background, several developing countries including Ghana, have moved to establish social health insurance (SHI) schemes, with the ultimate goal of progressively moving towards universal health care coverage.
Ghana established the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) in 2003 to replace a user fee system that had been in operation since the 1980s. Under the NHIS Act (Act 650, 852), the scheme is administered by the National Health Insurance Authority (NHIA) with headquarters in Accra. Essential functions of the NHIA include licensing and regulation of private mutual and commercial insurance schemes, determining premium levels and general oversight of NHIS operations. The scheme is funded from four primary sources: a 2.5% value-added-tax (VAT) on consumer goods and services, 2.5% of social security contributions from formal sector workers, investment income and premiums paid by informal members. According to the most recent figures, VAT accounted for 72% of the scheme's total revenue, while formal sector workers' contributions, investment income and premiums made up 20%, 4.7% and 3%, respectively (NHIA, 2013) . Formal sector workers, pensioners, persons over 70 years of age, children under 18 years (if a parent is a registered member), pregnant women, persons with disability or mental disorder and indigents are exempted from paying premiums. Everyone else, on the other hand, must formally enroll by paying a minimum income-adjusted annual premium of GHC 7.2 ($1.6 1 ). Registered members get a benefits package that covers emergency care, inpatient and outpatient care, deliveries, dental and essential drugs which together constitute an estimated 95% of the standard disease conditions in Ghana.
According to the theoretical literature, an efficient SHI scheme should have two essential characteristics: compulsory enrolment and a large number of people in the risk pool to allow for sufficient spreading of risk to meaningfully reduce the cost of care for those that fall ill (Akerlof, 1970; Varian, 1992) . Even though the NHIS law mandates enrolment for every adult, the relative size of the informal economy makes enforcement of this mandate prohibitively costly; thereby making enrolment defacto voluntary. Standard theoretical models of insurance predict two possible outcomes in the presence of voluntary insurance. First, individuals with private information about their high potential use of health care are more likely to self-select into insurance (Akerlof, 1970; Spence, 1973; Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976) . Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) show that this self-selection may lead to adverse selection where a plan that draws only high-risk individuals becomes too expensive to offer. Second, voluntary insurance may also lead to specific groups of the population, especially the poor, choosing zero or limited coverage. These poor individuals may reason that, at current prices, insurance is too expensive relative to other uses of their limited income (Wagstaff, 2000; World Bank, 2000) . As a result, they may choose not to buy health insurance. Indeed, given the higher concentration of poverty in the informal sector, non-zero premiums and entry fees, the NHIS could price out a large section of the poor, thus undermining one of the fundamental justifications for publicly provided health insurance-improving the distribution of services. In line with the theoretical predictions, a large body of empirical studies have found that, in the absence of subsidies, not only does voluntary health insurance schemes fail to reach a large segment of the population, they also exclude a vast majority of the poor and vulnerable (Ekman, 2004; De Allegri et al., 2006; Schneider and Hanson, 2006; Jowett and Hsiao, 2007; Lieberman and Wagstaff, 2009; Miller et al., 2013; Abiiro et al., 2016; Alhassan et al., 2016; Kaufmann, Schmid and Boes, 2017) .
This article explores the factors that explain the uptake of voluntary health insurance in Ghana. While a few empirical studies have examined the determinants of enrolment in the NHIS (e.g. Mensah et al., 2010; Gobah and Zhang 2011) , none of these studies distinguishes between voluntary and compulsory health insurance and how these different types of health insurance influence the use of health care services. Given that formal sector workers in Ghana acquire membership of the NHIS by holding a formal sector job, the factors determining their enrolment will be correlated with factors associated with the likelihood of obtaining a formal sector jobmost notably, a relatively high level of human capital. Therefore, the characteristics of a typical adult who purchases voluntary health insurance will be different from that of a formal sector member. Failure to distinguish between the two modes of enrolment could result in misidentifying the primary drivers of voluntary enrolment. Additionally, given that achieving universal coverage essentially means achieving universal coverage of adults outside the formal sector, the focus should be on understanding the possible drivers of enrolment among that segment of the population. This article aims to attempt to fill that gap in the literature. Additionally, we investigate whether voluntary health insurance has an additional impact on the use of health care resources.
Methods

Data description
The dataset used in this study is the first wave of the Ghana Socioeconomic Panel Survey (GSPS) 2009/2010 obtained from the World Bank's Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS). The GSPS is conducted by the Economic Growth Center (EGC) at Yale University and the Institute of Statistical, Social, and Economic Research (ISSER) at the University of Ghana. In all 5009 households were interviewed across the 10 regions of Ghana about a broad range of socio-economic and demographic topics such as employment, education, health, labour market activities, consumption patterns and asset ownership.
Information on individual household members' health insurance enrolment status, self-reported health, smoking and alcohol consumption behaviour, the frequency of hospital visits, height and weight are obtained from the household health component. The demographic components contain information on age, level of education, gender, location and marital status. The dataset does not contain information on household wealth-a significant predictor of health insurance demand. Following Filmer and Pritchett (2001) , we use an index of household physical asset ownership to proxy household wealth. This index is constructed using the method of Principal Component Analysis as proposed by Filmer and Pritchett (2001) . A total of 23 asset indicators are aggregated in the construction of the index. These include variables on household ownership of durable goods, the source of drinking water, type of toilet, the source of lighting, main cooking material and type of dwelling construction material.
Estimation sample
Formal members of the scheme are defined as registered members who work in the formal sector and contribute to social security. The formal sector comprises economic activities, public or private, that fall under the purview of state or quasi-state regulators. Informal members, on the other hand, consist of members who pay annual premiums to register or maintain membership in the scheme. These are mainly adults 18 years and above who do not work in the formal sector and do not qualify for exemptions.
Since the first part of the study focuses on identifying the drivers of voluntary enrolment in the NHIS, the sample for this analysis comprises only non-exempted adults outside the formal sector with and without health insurance. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics by insurance status for these observations. We observe that the age distribution is similar in the insured and uninsured samples which suggest that an individual is equally likely to be insured or insured given their age. The distribution of the wealth index confirms our hypothesis that individuals from relatively poor households are less likely to enrol voluntarily in the NHIS. More specifically, 22% of insured individuals, compared with 36% in the uninsured sample, come from households in the bottom quintile. In contrast, the proportion of insured individuals from households in the top quintile is 16 percentage points higher than the proportion of uninsured individuals in the same quintile. As anticipated, a majority of observations in our sample are self-employed, with a slightly higher proportion (of the self-employed) self-enroling in the NHIS. The educational distribution of the sample is equally unsurprising. Since we are dealing with adults outside the formal sector, we expect a vast majority of observations to have lower levels of education. Indeed, the highest education level of >80% of observations in both the insured and uninsured is primary or no formal education.
For estimating the impact of voluntary health insurance uptake on health care use, we choose a sample that includes all currently registered formal and informal members of the NHIS. Formal members who have other private insurance are dropped because of the likelihood that their frequency of use of NHIS benefits may be biased. This bias may arise whether we consider the NHIS and private health insurance as substitutes or complements. If the two schemes are substitutes, then such individuals will use less of NHIS benefits if the relative cost of private care is lower and vice versa. On the other hand, if the schemes are complements, then these individuals will use less NHIS if the relative cost of private care increases. Therefore, either way, enrolment in private insurance may bias the use of NHIS benefits. The number of annual hospital visit is our proxy for health care use. We report the descriptive statistics for this sample in Table 2 . In general, the table shows significant differences in the covariate distributions between the treated and controls groups which are unsurprising given that individuals selfselect into the formal sector based on specific characteristics. The average annual frequency of hospital visit for a formal member of the scheme is two, compared with more than three for an average informal member. This estimate implies that, on average, an informal member consumes about 60% more care relative to a formal member.
Specification
Health insurance decision We model the binary decision of whether to buy health insurance or not with a probit model. Even though a person's decision to buy or not to buy health insurance is unobserved, the outcome-whether he/she purchase health insurance or not-is observed. According to consumer choice theory, a consumer only purchases a good if the utility of the purchase (benefit) exceeds the utility from whatever could have been purchased at that cost. We model this difference between benefit and cost as a latent variable y Ã such that:
y Ã is a latent variable that represents the difference in utility derived by an individual from purchasing or not purchasing health insurance, x 0 is a vector of exogenous covariates and e is an independently and identically distributed error term $ Nð0; 1Þ. The observed binary variable y, relates to the latent variable, y Ã , such that:
Thus, y takes a value of 1 if an individual buys health insurance. The probability that an individual purchases health insurance (y ¼ 1) can be derived as:
where U is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. may perform worse than matching (Rosenbaum, 2002) . In our case, because self-selection is a significant problem in voluntary health insurance, it is natural to employ matching methods in our estimation of treatment effects. The basic idea of matching involves pairing treated and control units that are similar concerning all critical pretreatment observable characteristics (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002) . When all relevant differences between any two units are controlled for in the observable covariates, then the differences in the outcomes of the participants and control group can be attributed only to the treatment (Fisher, 1925; Cox, 1958) . Following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) we define the propensity score as
where W i ¼ ½0; 1 is the indicator of exposure to treatment for unit i and X i is the vector of unit pre-treatment characteristics. They show that if exposure to treatment, conditional on observables characteristics, is random then the propensity score, pðxÞ, is also random. As a result, if the propensity score, pðxÞ, is known then the average impact of voluntary health insurance uptake on health care use (for the average informal member)-the average effect of treatment on the treated (ATT)-can be estimated as
However, it must be noted that treatment effects are only identified if conditional on the propensity scores, potential outcomes are independent of treatment,
Þ, and if enough overlap (or common support) exists between the propensity score distributions of the treated and control groups. To ensure that the treatment effect is not sensitive to the choice of estimation techniques, we tried various techniques such as propensity score stratification, propensity score matching: nearest neighbour, radius and kernel and ordinary least squares (OLSs).
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Findings
Health insurance uptake Table 3 presents the average marginal effects from the regression of the likelihood of voluntary health insurance uptake on potential determinants. As expected, the results confirm our hypothesis that older adults are more likely to buy health insurance. More specifically, adults aged 65 and above, on average, have a 54% higher likelihood of buying health insurance compared with 18-24 year olds. Similarly, adults aged 45-64, on average, are 14% more likely to buy voluntary health insurance relative to 18-24 year-olds. However, we find no difference between the likelihood of voluntary health insurance uptake for 25-44 and 18-24-year-old adults. The uptake of voluntary health insurance also rises with wealth. Specifically, relative to the bottom quintile, the likelihood of buying health insurance increases as we move up the income quintiles.
Concerning education, higher education is positively associated with the likelihood of voluntary health insurance uptake. More specifically, relative to individuals with no education, adults with primary education are 7% more likely to buy voluntary health insurance. That difference is 14% and 22.6% for adults with secondary and post-secondary education, respectively. The findings also show that informal employees are no more likely to buy voluntary health insurance than adults who are not working, but self-employed individuals are 4% more likely to buy health insurance. Regarding health, individuals who self-reported as unhealthy have a higher chance of buying health insurance but adults who smoke and drink at least once a week are less likely to buy health insurance. There are also significant regional differences in the likelihood of voluntary health insurance uptake. Specifically, compared with adults living in the coastal regions, adults in the Middle and Northern regions are, respectively, 19% and 28% more likely to buy voluntary health insurance. Moreover, adults from relatively larger households, married individuals and women are also more likely to buy voluntary health insurance.
Impact on health care utilization
The results of the propensity score estimation are presented in Table 4 . This regression estimates the likelihood of voluntary health insurance uptake by a registered member (formal and informal) of the NHIS. The findings show that age and education level are both negatively correlated with the likelihood of voluntary health insurance uptake. Similarly, wealthier individuals are also less likely to have voluntary health insurance because they are more likely to work in the formal sector. Even though the result of the participation regression in Table 4 looks interesting its primary purpose is to t statistics in parentheses, **P < 0.05, ***P < 0.001.
derive the propensity scores to be used in matching the treated and the control groups. The distribution of the propensity scores is presented in Figure 1 . The distribution of the scores before matching shows minimal overlap-a concentration of scores of treated units (informal members) in the right tail of the distribution. This result is as expected, given the significant differences in some of the observable characteristics of formal and informal members of the NHIS (see Table 2 ). Given the severe lack of overlap and the need to significantly reduce selection bias, we employ greedy matching to restrict the matching sample to observations with similar propensity scores across the two groups. The density plot of the propensity scores for this limited sample (see right panel of Figure 1 ) indicates a good balance; implying that the treated and control groups are similar and bias in the distribution of the propensity scores is significantly reduced.
Also, we perform a balancing test (t-test) to assess the covariate balance between the treated and control groups. The result of this ttest, presented in Table 5 , shows that all the standardized mean differences in the observable covariates are not significant (at the 5% level). We, therefore, conclude that the treated and control groups are well balanced and that bias in the distribution of the covariates has been substantially and sufficiently reduced (in a statistical sense).
The average treatment effect estimates are reported in Table 6 . The ATT estimates using the nearest neighbour and radius matching techniques indicate an average impact of 0.6 days-significant at the 5% level. This finding suggests that, compared with formal members of the NHIS, on average, individuals who purchase voluntary health insurance, visit the hospital 0.6 more days annually. The estimate when kernel matching is used, on the other hand, puts this impact slightly higher at 0.7 days. Since these results are estimated using only closely matched pairs of treated and control units, they apply only to this sub-sample. By contrast, the propensity score stratification method estimates the average impact on the entire sample and, therefore, provides an estimate of the (population) average impact of voluntary health insurance uptake. The result from this approach indicates a statistically significant effect of 0.8 days (for the ATE)-indicating that voluntary health insurance uptake, on average, increases annual hospital visits by nearly a day.
Finally, we seek to evaluate whether the OLS estimate on the matched sample is consistent with estimates from the propensity score matching and stratification approaches. The OLS result (see Table 6 ) indicates that voluntary health insurance uptake increases annual hospital visits by 0.7 days (a result that is close to the value from the kernel matching method and within the range suggested by the other techniques). Given the significance and consistency of the estimates across the different approaches, we can say with confidence that buyers of voluntary health insurance consume more health care (in the form of a higher number of hospital visits).
Sensitivity analysis
Our average treatment effects are obtained assuming unconfoundedness. However, if there are unobserved variables that simultaneously Sample comprise formal and informal members of the NHIS. t statistics in parentheses, *P < 0.01, **P < 0.05, ***P < 0.001. Figure 1 . Density distribution of propensity scores before and after matching.
affect treatment assignment and potential outcomes a hidden bias might arise (Rosenbaum, 2002) . In such situations, matching estimators are no longer robust. We, therefore, employ the approach proposed by Rosenbaum (2002) and implemented by DiPrete and Gangl (2004) to test whether there are unobserved variables that simultaneously impact the likelihood of voluntary health insurance uptake and annual hospital visit count.
The Rosenbaum method is grounded on the assumption that the effect of a potential hidden bias in the treatment estimates can be measured relative to a sensitivity parameter (C). A study is said to have no hidden bias if C ¼ 1. On the other hand, as the level of C increases so does the level of the bias. Given that the actual value of C is unknown, the analysis proceeds by assessing how large C has to be before the significance of our estimated treatment effect changes. The maximum C at which this hypothesis holds is called the 'Rosenbaum bounds', and it provides bounds on the estimate. Rosenbaum (2002) suggests that a study is not robust if a small change in the odds of participation (CC < < 1:5Þ makes the P-value insignificant.
The result of the sensitivity analysis is presented in Table 7 . The test result (obtained after nearest neighbour matching) reveals that our treatment estimate becomes sensitive to hidden bias at C > 1.5. This finding implies that two similar individuals with the same sets of observable covariates could differ in their odds of receiving treatment by as much as a factor of 1.5 and higher because of different values on an unobserved covariate. In other words, conditioned on the covariates, two identical individuals could differ in the odds of voluntary health insurance uptake, occasioned by an unobserved covariate, such that one could be 1.5 times more likely to purchase voluntary health insurance. This is unlikely given that an informal member of the NHIS with observable characteristics identical to that of a formal member has as much a chance of working in the formal sector and subsequently obtaining health insurance. We, therefore, conclude, given the relatively higher value or C, that the estimated treatment effect is not significantly sensitive to hidden bias.
Conclusions and discussion
Using data from the 2009/2010 GSPS, this article addresses issues that have implications for the sustainability of the NHIS and voluntary health insurance schemes in general. Although a great deal has been written about the NHIS, existing research had yet to examine how the different modes of uptake might impact health care utilization. This article has examined the factors associated with voluntary health insurance uptake and how its dynamics impact health care use.
This investigation finds that older people, individuals from wealthier households, people with higher education and individuals with a high likelihood of seeking care (those in poor health) are more likely to purchase voluntary health insurance. This finding is Type of kernel is gaussian, bandwidth (0.1). consistent with much of the previous empirical literature that has explored determinants of participation in the NHIS (see NketiahAmponsah, 2009; Jehu-Appiah et al., 2011; Aryeetey et al., 2013; Abiiro et al., 2016; Alhassan et al., 2016) . The importance of wealth and education in determining voluntary uptake of insurance is concerning. It suggests that, where health insurance uptake is voluntary, coverage will be biased against the poor and lesser educated. This finding is particularly worrisome because non-voluntary uptake, by being attached to formal sector employment, already biases insurance against the poor.
These findings are relevant to at least two aspects of the NHIS. An essential goal of the scheme is to protect the poor against adverse health shocks and to improve equity. However, as the results show, the imposition of premiums and entry fees is excluding the poor from the scheme, which may worsen equity. Additionally, voluntary health insurance results in selection bias which may increase the cost of care (per insured person) and reduce efficiency by including more of the higher-risk population.
The finding that smoking and alcohol consumption are negatively associated with the propensity to buy health insurance was unexpected. This result may be an indication that individuals who smoke and consume alcohol are less risk-averse than the rest of the population, and therefore less likely to buy health insurance. However, it is also possible that the cutoff of 'once a week', which is a relatively low threshold for alcohol consumption and smoking (implying that most people respond positively are likely casual users), means that this result may derive from the fact that membership of that group may be highly correlated with attributes such as masculinity, religion, age and other attributes that may be negatively correlated with voluntary insurance uptake.
Concerning the behaviour of those who purchase health insurance voluntarily, using annual hospital visit count as a crude measure of health care use, we find that voluntary health insurance uptake results in higher use of health care services. More specifically, our results show that voluntary health insurance increases annual hospital visits by somewhere between 0.6 and 0.8 days. This is a difference in behaviour that is related to the manner in which health insurance is obtained. This result could have been obtained merely as result of the fact that the treated group is comprised of a large number of firsttime health insurance buyers. In that case, our estimated effect would simply be capturing pent-up demand for health care. We test this hypothesis by estimating the effects on only observations for persons who have renewed their health insurance at least once. The results, however, are similar to the findings in Table 6 -indicating that pentup demand is not the cause of the differential. Therefore, in general, this finding likely implies suboptimal levels of health care use on the part of those who are insured voluntary or compulsorily, but we do not have enough information to determine which group may be behaving sub-optimally. In short, the results do not tell us whether the voluntarily insured are 'overusing' health care or whether the compulsorily insured are 'underusing' health care. It merely indicates that one of these outcomes (or both) is occurring.
The higher health care utilization by voluntary purchasers (informal users) may be an indication of overuse if it is motivated by loss aversion-as applied in reference-dependent theories (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Koszegi and Rabin, 2006) . Given that an individual who purchases voluntary health insurance has to pay to renew their subscription annually, it is reasonable to expect that if they believe they may be unable to afford insurance upon expiration of current coverage they are likely to increase health care use just before current coverage expires. By contrast, formal sector workers do not pay premiums so they should be able to smooth out their health care consumption. If this hypothesis holds, then on average, formal members of the NHIS will consume less health care relative to informal members. This assumption can be tested if data become available on the insurance renewal dates (for individuals who purchase voluntary health insurance) and the dates that health care is sought. This information would allow us to compare health care use close to the period of expiration of health insurance to that of the average formal member of the NHIS. Given that we have no such data, this remains a question that will have to be addressed in future investigations when such data are available.
Imperfect information, framing and mental accounting theories also present the possibility that the difference in health care utilization can be an indication of underuse on the part of the compulsorily insured (formal users). First, there is the possibility that some of those who are automatically insured may not be fully aware of the range of benefits available from insurance-leading to underuse. Secondly, framing and mental accounting theories suggest that benefits that are given automatically, rather than consciously acquired, are more likely to be underutilized (Thaler, 1999; Kahneman and Tversky, 2000) . These hypotheses too can be tested, but that would require more detailed information on the awareness and motivations of those who are insured. That type of data is not currently available.
Another limitation of this paper is that, while we are confident in our findings, we cannot make a definitive statement about health care costs. Though our results indicate more significant use on the part of informal users, we cannot assert (with certainty) that the cost of health care by an average informal (voluntary) member exceeds that of an identical formal (compulsory) member. Since we have no data about the cost and type of treatment sought by individuals, we are unable to determine if increased use of health care necessarily translates into higher cost of care. However, given that claims payments are based on quantity, and not quality, of care offered it is very likely that increased health care use also means increased health care cost for informal users. However, as above, this assertion must be strongly caveated by the proviso that we do not yet have a basis to attach a judgement (positive or negative) to more frequent use (and, by implication, higher costs).
Finally, we note that the dataset used (2009/2010 GSPS) has not been repeated and is thus the latest database to measure health care insurance coverage and use in Ghana. This is not a disadvantage because this particular database precedes changes to the NHIS that may have had a significant impact on how members seek care-thus moderating the 'natural experiment' conditions that we exploit in this paper. Hopefully, future data gathering efforts will allow for the comparison of behavior before and after the introduction of more recent changes.
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Notes
1. Converted at 10 January 2018 exchange rate of US$0.22 to 1 GHS. 2. Propensity score stratification involves using the estimated propensity scores to stratify the sample into subclasses with similar propensity scores. The treatment effect is then estimated as a weighted sum of the differences of sample means across strata. On the other hand, nearest neighbour, radius and kernel matching use the propensity score to match a treated unit to a closest control unit. For a detailed analysis of these matching methods, see Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) , Heckman et al. (1998) and Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) .
